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Introduction
Following repeated attempts to reform Dutch dismissals law in
the past, Professor Rood was asked in 1999 to form a com-
mittee to study possible reforms of the dismissals process. The
committee’s report, published in November 2000, called for the
abolition of the preventive check on dismissals by the Center
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for Work and Income and argued in favor of an ex post pro-
cedure to resolve disputes. The Committee’s proposals were, at
the request of the government, examined by the bipartite Labor
Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, STAR.) The Foundation,
while recognizing weaknesses in the current system, sharply crit-
icized the proposal, thereby stalling further reform. Strikingly,
it took more than two years and a half for the trade unions’
and employers’ organization to come up with a stance on the
report.1
It would be presumptuous for us to assess which side was right —
at best, the arguments developed in this lecture will shed some
light on the relevant trade-oﬀs. Rather, we see this episode as
epitomizing the fact that there may be no labor market institu-
tion more controversial than employment protection regulation—
the set of laws and procedures regulating separations between
ﬁrms and workers. Even in a country such as the Netherlands,
known for the quality of its social dialog,2 a n di nas t a t eo fl o w
unemployment, where one would believe the topic could be ap-
proached dispassionately, social partners had a hard time reach-
ing a conclusion.
More generally, wherever the issue of employment protection is
1. The proposition to abolish the administrative procedure received strong
support from the largest employers’ association. Trade unions were reluc-
tant, and employers in the small and medium-size business sectors were
keen to keep the existing and relatively cheap procedure.
2. This social dialogue in turn has been facilitated by close networking
between unions, employers’ organizations, the government, and other third
parties (advisory bodies, central bank), as argued in Den Butter and Mosch
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raised:
• Workers focus on the pain of unemployment, and argue
that such pain should be taken into account by ﬁrms
when they consider closing a plant, or laying oﬀ a worker.
That workers protected by employment protection would
favor it is no great surprise. But evidence from surveys
shows that support for employment protection is more
general, more broad based.
• Firms, on the other hand, complain not only about the
direct cost, but also about the complexity and the uncer-
tainty introduced by employment protection regulation.
They argue that it makes it diﬃcult for them to adjust
to changes in technology and product demand, and that
this in turn decreases eﬃciency, increases labor cost and,
in so doing, deters job creation.
• Most economists and international economic organiza-
tions, from the OECD to the IMF, tend to side with
ﬁrms. There is, they argue, a trade-oﬀ between insurance
and eﬃciency. The current systems impede reallocation,
and, by implication, reduce eﬃciency. They lead to higher
costs, and thus lower employment. At a minimum, they
could and should be made more eﬃcient. More likely,
overall employment protection should be reduced.
Faced with such conﬂicting demands and advice, the govern-
ments of Western Europe have been timid. They have learned,
often the hard way, that workers covered by employment pro-
tection are not eager to see it reduced, and that these workersEmployment Protection Reform 4
represent the majority of the labor force, and a large part of the
electorate. So, most recent employment protection reforms have
worked at the margin, through the introduction and extension
of the scope for ﬁxed duration contracts—contracts subject to
more limited employment protection and simpler administrative
rules. For the most part, employment protection for regular con-
tracts has remained unchanged. The evidence so far is that this
dual system has led to an increasingly dual labor market, with
mixed eﬃciency and negative distributional eﬀects.
We believe that what has been missing most in these discussions
and in these reforms is a clear idea of what “good employment
protection regulation” should look like. Starting from the status
quo, ﬁrms and international organizations have argued for less
protection. Workers and unions have fought to keep the protec-
tion they had. Governments have looked for politically feasible
incremental reforms. But the ultimate goal, the shape of optimal
employment protection, has been left undeﬁned.
Our goal in this lecture is to explore this question. The lecture
has three parts. We begin by using economic reasoning to draw
the contours of a good employment protection system. We then
describe employment protection systems in France and in the
Netherlands. Having done so, we indicate directions for reform.Employment Protection Reform 5
1 Economic analysis: letting ﬁrms
internalize the social cost of their layoﬀs
1.1 Broad principle
Let us begin with a broad principle: Economic agents can be
given discretion provided that they bear the cost that their de-
cisions impose on other agents. This “internalization of external-
ities” ensures that the decision-maker in question reﬂects oth-
ers’ preferences and is therefore accountable. For example, it is
widely accepted that polluters ought to pay for the social cost
of their pollution.
The translation of this broad principle in the matter of employ-
ment is that ﬁrms ought to pay for the cost they impose on
society when they lay workers oﬀ. This cost includes the ﬁnan-
cial cost born by the unemployment insurance (UI) fund and the
psychological and other costs born by the dismissed worker.3 The
former can be addressed through a layoﬀ tax, and the latter, as
it now is, through severance pay. In particular, a full internaliza-
tion of the impact of a layoﬀ on the UI fund calls for a layoﬀ tax
equal to subsequent unemployment beneﬁts, or, in other words,
for a contribution rate— deﬁned as the ratio of the layoﬀ tax to
unemployment beneﬁts— equal to 1.
The layoﬀ tax could be computed in two ways. It could be a
ﬁxed amount, possibly indexed on various observables such as
age, or location. Alternatively, and following the US experience
rating system put in place in the 1930s, the tax could be levied
3. Collective layoﬀs may further impose substantial costs on local com-
munities in a depressed area.Employment Protection Reform 6
“ex post” on the basis of the actual length of unemployment
of the dismissed worker. The latter approach oﬀers two beneﬁts
besides simplicity. First, it better reﬂects the actual cost of the
layoﬀ for the fund; ﬁrms’ layoﬀ decisions therefore react more
ﬁnely to the actual re-employability of the worker. Second, ex
post tax assessments incentivize ﬁrms to provide better training
to their employees so that they can ﬁnd a job more quickly after
al a y o ﬀ .
It may actually be worth describing the “experience rated” sys-
tems of unemployment contributions used in the United States
in more detail.4 The systems vary across states, but all base the
payments of ﬁrms on their past behavior (as in a bonus-malus
system). The most commonly used system is called the “reserve
ratio” system of unemployment contributions. Leaving aside the
many complicated details, its principle is simple: Each ﬁrm has
a running balance with the state unemployment agency, with
contributions by the ﬁrm to the fund on one side, and bene-
ﬁts paid by the agency to the workers laid oﬀ by the ﬁrm on
the other. Once a year, the state computes the net outstanding
balance, and requires the ﬁrm to pay some proportion of this
outstanding balance over the following year. The factor of pro-
portionality depends both on the net balance of the ﬁrm, and
the net balance of the state fund as a whole. This system has
two implications:
• Ignoring discounting, and assuming that ﬁrms do not go
4. A useful description of the US experience is given in Foug` ere and Mar-
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bankrupt and do not hit the various ceilings that limit
contributions (all considerations being relevant in prac-
tice), ﬁrms eventually pay the full cost of unemployment
beneﬁts for the workers they lay oﬀ—the contribution
rate is equal to one.
• The factor of proportionality determines how the timing
of payments depends on current and past layoﬀs. If the
factor of proportionality is equal to one, so ﬁrms are asked
to return to zero balance each year, then payments are
closely related to current (or more precisely last year’s)
layoﬀs. The lower the factor of proportionality, the more
contributions depend on past layoﬀs in the more distant
past.
How should one then think about the choice of the fac-
tor of proportionality? If ﬁrms are operating in a sta-
ble, ergodic, environment, going sometimes through good
times, sometimes through bad times, then letting the fac-
tor of proportionality be small will make the ﬁrm’s con-
tributions depend on its mean observed layoﬀ rate in the
past, which is also equal to the probability of a layoﬀ in
the future. If, however, as is more likely, the underlying
probability changes over time, then a higher factor of pro-
portionality, giving more weight to recent layoﬀs, will be
closer to the underlying current probability. But it will
impose higher liquidity costs on ﬁrms.
Note (and we shall come back to this in more detail) that the
principle of internalization is at odds with the systems of em-Employment Protection Reform 8
ployment protection prevailing in France and the Netherlands in
at least three related dimensions. First, in these systems, con-
tributions by ﬁrms to the unemployment insurance fund take
the form of payroll taxes: A ﬁrm with a higher layoﬀ rate does
not pay higher contributions to the unemployment insurance
fund. In other words, the contribution rate is zero. Second, in
the absence of layoﬀ taxes, unemployment beneﬁts must be ﬁ-
nanced through the payroll tax, providing an added incentive
for ﬁrms to lay workers oﬀ. Third (and relatedly!), the layoﬀ
process is subject to administrative and judicial control. Firms
have to prove either fault by the worker in the case of an individ-
ual layoﬀ, or economic need in the case of collective layoﬀs. By
contrast, under the economic approach, employment protection
stems from the deterrence eﬀect of a layoﬀ tax rather than from
an administered process.
1.2 Complications
This benchmark of a unit contribution rate deﬁnes a useful and
simple guiding principle: a ﬁrm should pay to the insurance fund
the full amount of unemployment beneﬁts received by the dis-
missed worker. In practice, the principle has to be reﬁned. We
now study (separately) four major complications: limited un-
employment insurance, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial fragility, ex post wage
bargaining, and ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity, and discuss, in
each case, how they modify our conclusions.5
a) Limited unemployment insurance
5. See Blanchard-Tirole (2003b) for a formal treatment of these ideas.Employment Protection Reform 9
Workers should not be, and in practice are not, fully insured
against the unemployment risk: to the extent that the agency
cannot fully monitor the search behavior of the unemployed,
oﬀering anything close to full insurance would lead the unem-
ployed to stop searching and remain unemployed.6
A number of recent reforms of the unemployment system in Eu-
rope, such as the PARE in France, have aimed at combining
more generous and longer lasting unemployment beneﬁts with
stronger incentives for the unemployed to accept jobs if oﬀered
by the unemployment agency. These reforms clearly go in the
right direction. They potentially oﬀer better tailored insurance:
If truly no jobs are available, then the unemployed continue to
receive unemployment beneﬁts. And they remove, at least in
principle, some of the problems associated with the open ended
unemployment beneﬁts of the past. But realistically, even the
best designed systems cannot fully eliminate monitoring prob-
lems, and so, less than full insurance is optimal.
Under incomplete insurance, the ﬁrm exerts two externalities
when laying a worker oﬀ: one on the unemployment insurance
fund, and the other on the worker. Because the worker cannot,
for incentive reasons, be fully compensated by the fund, the ﬁrm
ought to take the net cost to the worker into account. To lead
6. As with any insurance scheme and as shown theoretically by Pauly
(1974), such incomplete insurance may require prohibiting supplementary
arrangements, as secondary insurers and insurees have incentives to strike
supplementary insurance deals at the detriment of the primary insurer (as
was observed for example in the Netherlands for disability schemes).
For a recent survey of the literature on unemployment insurance, see for
example Frederiksson and Holmlund (2003).Employment Protection Reform 10
ﬁrms to take these costs into account, unemployment contribu-
tions by ﬁrms to the agency must now exceed the unemployment
beneﬁts paid by the agency to workers: The optimal contribu-
tion rate is now greater than one. The lower the feasible level
of insurance, the higher the utility costs that layoﬀs impose on
laid-oﬀ workers and the higher the contribution rate.
Under this deviation from the benchmark, unemployment in-
surance and employment protection are (imperfect) substitutes.
The poorer the insurance, the higher the optimal degree of em-
ployment protection. While the result is normative, this negative
relation appears to be present in the data across Continental
European countries.7 The countries with the highest degree of
employment protection (using the OECD index) are also the
countries where unemployment insurance coverage is relatively
limited.
b) Firms’ ﬁnancial fragility
Introducing ﬁnancial fragility considerations raises two distinct
issues: the possibility that a layoﬀf tax may encourage rather
than discourage dismissals and the concern that the tax may be
evaded.
Let us start with the former. In the case of small and medium
enterprises, or else, large undiversiﬁed ﬁrms, layoﬀs often occur
when the ﬁrm encounters hardship. For such ﬁrms, a layoﬀ tax
may compound the diﬃculties and potentially trigger further
layoﬀs. Should the contribution rate therefore be brought down
7. See for example Boeri (2002).Employment Protection Reform 11
and be less than unitary in order to limit the scope for such
“snowball eﬀects”?
One can entertain one of two opposite views in this respect.
The ﬁrst is that one should not take the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial struc-
tures as given. A wide array of arrangements across sectors and
companies are observed, that show that ﬁnancial arrangements
adjust to accommodate the speciﬁcities of the companies’ en-
vironments. One may therefore expect that ﬁrms would in the
long term adjust their ﬁnancing to reﬂect the existence of a
layoﬀ tax. They will want to insulate spillovers of an adverse
e v o l u t i o ni nt h e i ra c t i v i t yA on their otherwise healthy activ-
ity B. One may hope that, in response to an increase in layoﬀ
taxes, ﬁnancial markets will at least partly adjust to alleviate
the problem, providing more funds to the ﬁrms in bad times
in order to allow them to pay the now higher layoﬀ tax. Con-
cretely, ﬁrms may take on more long-term debt and issue more
equity, obtain larger credit lines from banks, and more generally
alter their risk management. This line of thought presumes that
ﬁnancial markets will in the long term fully adjust to the new
regulatory environment, and implies that the principle of full
internalization continues to apply.
Alternatively, one can take a less optimistic view of the ability
of ﬁrms to adjust their ﬁnancial structure; furthermore one must
surely do so at the time of the introduction of the layoﬀ tax as
ﬁnancial structures of existing ﬁrms are still run by legacy ar-
rangements. Under that view, in order to avoid snowball eﬀects,
the layoﬀ tax should then be lower than unitary.Employment Protection Reform 12
To sum up, the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial fragility implies that the layoﬀ
tax should grow after its initial introduction to reach a level that
is smaller than or equal to the cost of unemployment. How close
the contribution rate should be to one depends on one’s opti-
mism as to the possibility of adjustment of ﬁnancial structures.
Let us now come to the second issue, the possibility that the
layoﬀ tax be evaded. An analogy with environmental matters
is useful here. There is much evidence that activities that are
environmentally hazardous and therefore subject to contingent
environmental penalties tend to be operated by separate, poorly
capitalized, collateral-free companies. The strategy is one of tax
evasion and consists in leaving the state with a judgment proof
entity in case of pollution or disaster. Although less extreme, lay-
oﬀ taxes may generate qualitatively similar behaviors. Activities
with high layoﬀ risks might be spun oﬀ into separate entities;
or ﬁrms that encounter hardship may reduce their capitaliza-
tion or delocalize their new activities abroad in order to evade
future layoﬀ taxes. There is no simple solution to this prob-
lem. Fundamentally, the UI fund cannot monitor the solvency
of each and every undertaking in the country. But (imperfect)
solutions exist: the posting of collateral (with the equivalent of
“margin calls” by the UI fund, as the ﬁrm’s debit increases); the
requirement of a bank guarantee; liability tracing, that is mak-
ing “Potentially Responsible Parties” liable as is done in the US
since 1980 in environmental matters through the ComprehensiveEmployment Protection Reform 13
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.
c) Ex post wage bargaining
Other things equal, a transfer of the ﬁnancing of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts from the payroll tax to a layoﬀ tax increases ef-
ﬁciency and therefore encourages job creation. This reasoning,
though, presumes wage moderation or, in the parlance of eco-
nomics, wage bonding. By contrast, under wage renegotiations,8
the introduction of a layoﬀ tax may raise the cost of labor and
discourage job creation. The reason is that the layoﬀ tax and
the cut in the payroll tax both make the ﬁrm more accountable
for its layoﬀs and thus weaken its bargaining position vis-` a-vis
workers.
What should the state then do? It now clearly faces a trade-oﬀ:
Making ﬁrms pay for the full cost of an additional layoﬀ will
lead ﬁrms to take the right decision at the destruction margin:
But this high contribution rate will also increase the bargaining
power of workers, and thus increase the wage. This will increase
the overall cost of labor and will adversely aﬀect job creation.
By how much will depend on the amount of eﬀective bonding.
Conversely, choosing a contribution rate less than one will lead
ﬁrms to destroy too many jobs, and lead to too many layoﬀs. It
will however lead to a smaller increase in the overall cost of labor
and thus have a smaller adverse eﬀect on employment creation.
In short, the more ﬁrms are made to pay for the expected cost
of unemployment beneﬁts, the smaller the distortion will be at
8. In particular if they occur at the ﬁrm’s or worker’s level.Employment Protection Reform 14
the destruction margin, but the larger the distortion will be at
the creation margin.
Thus, to the extent that eﬀective bonding is limited, the contri-
bution rate must now be less than one. It will be closer to one,
the higher the workers’ commitment to wage moderation, or, in
the absence of commitment, the lower their bargaining power.
d) Heterogeneity of ﬁrms and workers
Not all ﬁrms and all workers are alike. What does a positive
contribution rate imply for their respective fortunes?
Let us ﬁrst handle ﬁrms’ heterogeneity by dividing them into
“weak” and “strong” ﬁrms. Firms may be weak for one of several
reasons: they may have lower average productivity; or they may
face more volatile demand; or they may have shallow pockets
and therefore little liquidity to meet adverse shocks. Either way,
such ﬁrms will have more layoﬀs on average and thus will to pay
higher layoﬀ taxes.9 They will therefore have higher labor costs.
This is to some extent as should be, given that they impose
larger social costs. Things are a bit more complex, though, and,
in fact, ﬁrm heterogeneity calls for a reduced contribution rate.
Intuitively, if weak ﬁrms have an incentive to create jobs, so
do a fortiori strong ﬁrms. So addressing the creation margin
requires making it attractive for weak ﬁrms to create jobs. By
contrast, at the destruction margin, weak and strong ﬁrms face
a similar problem: ex-post, whether to keep the worker given the
9. They will not be able to pass those costs on to workers through lower
wages.Employment Protection Reform 15
realization of productivity. Put diﬀerently, a change in the layoﬀ
tax aﬀects the destruction margin of both weak and strong ﬁrms,
but aﬀects the creation margin only for weak ﬁrms. A small
reduction in the layoﬀ tax compensated by an increase in the
payroll tax cross-subsidizes weak ﬁrms and thereby encourages
job creation. To sum up, ﬁrm heterogeneity is a further argument
in favor of a contribution rate below one.10
So is worker heterogeneity, for pretty much the same reason.
“Weaker workers”, those with a lower expected productivity and
a higher layoﬀ probability, or with worse labor market prospects
when unemployed—say because they live in a depressed region—
will need to accept lower wages or else run the risk of remaining
unemployed when the layoﬀ tax is raised. A small reduction in
the layoﬀ tax compensated by an increase in the payroll tax
cross-subsidizes weak workers and therefore raises their employ-
ability.
Does worker heterogeneity therefore call for a reduction in the
contribution rate? The answer depends on whether the fragility
of certain categories of workers is observable by the state. Sup-
10. Interestingly, the Dutch Reduced Pay Fund, which pays for short-term
(less than 33 weeks) beneﬁts to the unemployed, is a sector-level fund (the
General Unemployment Fund, which pays the remaining beneﬁts by con-
trast is a national fund). Premia are diﬀerentiated across sectors (for ex-
ample, the sector of temporary work agencies had the highest payroll tax
rate: 9.20%). This diﬀerentiation is probably good from the point of view
of encouraging job creation in sectors with low layoﬀ rates. On the other
hand, because the fund is ﬁnanced through a payroll tax rather than a lay-
oﬀ tax, this diﬀerentiation does not help with the destruction margin. In
particular, high payroll tax rates in risky sectors raise the ﬁrms’ incentive
to lay workers oﬀ.Employment Protection Reform 16
pose ﬁrst that it is. The “weaker worker” may live in an isolated
labor market or depressed region, be senior, or else registered on
a disability list. In this case, the way to enhance the worker’s
employability is not to reduce the layoﬀ tax (after all, layoﬀs
of such workers are undesirable), but rather to subsidize the
employer. This subsidy can take the form of a targeted cut in
the payroll tax, as is done for example in the Netherlands for
workers with registered disability. Alternatively, one could de-
sign targeted job creation subsidies, although the latter, being
lump sum, are more likely to be abused than payroll tax reduc-
tions.
Some other forms of worker fragility cannot however be veriﬁed
by the state, at least not easily. In that case, facilitating the
worker’s employability then requires a reduction in the layoﬀ tax,
combined perhaps with the introduction of an unemployment-
length-insensitive component in the structure of the layoﬀ tax,
so as not to penalize too much workers who are likely to stay
unemployed for a long time.
1.3 Other considerations
Two further remarks to close the theoretical analysis:
First, we have focused on layoﬀs. Separations also occur as work-
ers quit either to another job or into unemployment. In the ab-
sence of a layoﬀ tax, the employer and employee have an incen-
tive to reclassify a quit into unemployment as a layoﬀ if, as is
the case in France and the Netherlands, workers who quit do not
receive unemployment beneﬁts. The introduction of a layoﬀ taxEmployment Protection Reform 17
reduces the incentives for such gaming of the insurance system.
In passing, a similar form of gaming used to occur in the Nether-
lands with respect to entry into disability status (as discussed
in van der Ploeg 2003). Until the reform of 1998, employers
and employees had a common interest in disguising a layoﬀ as
a disability. As there was no premium diﬀerentiation between
employers, the latter thereby did not have to incur the cost and
bother associated with dismissals, and workers’ access to the al-
lowance thereby became open-ended. Reforms since 1998 have
reduced the gains from reclassiﬁcation. Firms have to pay for
part of their former employees’ disability beneﬁts. Furthermore,
there have been reforms and there are further plans to bring
disabled workers back to work, for example by cutting beneﬁts
and by strengthening medical requirements.11
Second, and as we know for example from Belot-van Ours (2002)
and as we have already discussed with the issue of wage mod-
eration, the eﬀect of an institutional reform depends on other
institutional features. Another case in point is the governance
of the unemployment agency. To the extent that the layoﬀ tax
is assessed ex post on the actual beneﬁts paid to the dismissed
workers, employers will have an increased demand for oversee-
ing the agency. This raises the issue of who should have control
rights over the agency. An agency run by employers might hassle
the unemployed into accepting inappropriate jobs. Conversely,
11. The law allows employers to ﬁre disable workers if they have been on a
disability scheme for two years or longer. In some cases, disabled workers can
be ﬁred earlier if, for example, they did not try hard enough to reintegrate
the labor market (this being determined by the UWV, the oﬃce in charge
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an agency controlled by the workers or the government (as we
see in France) may exhibit the opposite bias. Independent agen-
cies or else a social-partners cooperative undertaking are the two
most appealing governance structures, but giving them a clear
mission certainly is no easy task.
2 The employment protection system in
France and the Netherlands
Having sketched the contours of an optimal system of employ-
ment protection, the next question is how it relates to actual em-
ployment protection systems in Europe. In this section, we shall
look at employment protection in France and the Netherlands.
Our purpose is not to give an exhaustive presentation of the two
systems, but rather to present them in such a way as to facilitate
the comparison with the conclusions of the previous section.12
Our tentative conclusions are that, relative to the optimal sys-
tem, (a) the French system is deeply ineﬃcient and (b) the Dutch
approach exhibits some of the same structural ﬂaws, but their
negative impact has been much alleviated by certain speciﬁci-
ties and pragmatic adjustments, which de facto have made the
Dutch labor market more ﬂexible than the French.13
12. Three useful sources on French institutions are P´ elissier et al.
(2002)(which presents the legal structure), CFDT (2003) (which gives a
user guide for workers) and JurisClasseur Groupe Lexis-Nexis (2002), which
gives the text and interpretation of the 2002 law, called “Loi de Moderni-
sation Sociale”.
13. On paper, the Netherlands are not that much more ﬂexible than
France, except for the regulation of temporary employment. While em-Employment Protection Reform 19
2.1 The need for motive
France: The general principle today is the need for motive: The
ﬁrm must have and must show “real and serious cause”. Only if
such a cause exists can the ﬁrm lay a worker oﬀ.
The law distinguishes between two types of layoﬀs:
• “Personal” (that is, related to the behavior of the em-
ployee.) The ﬁrm must show that the layoﬀ is the result
of a “serious misdemeanor” (“faute s´ erieuse”.) What “se-
rious” means is not clearly deﬁned (One deﬁnition, found
in the reference labor law text (P´ elissier et al. 2002), is:
“Serious: suﬃcient to justify the layoﬀ”...). It does not re-
quire malicious intent, but it must be more than a “light
misdemeanor” (“faute l´ eg` ere”) which does not justify a
layoﬀ.
• “Economic” (that is, related to the situation of the ﬁrm).
ployment protection legislation indices must be taken with caution, the
following table indicates the analogies in legislation concerning regular
employment in the two countries:
Labour Market Statistics – strictness of employment
protection legislation (EPL)
late 80s late 90s
FRA NLD FRA NLD
Overall EPL Version 1 2,7 2,7 3 2,1
Regular employment 2,3 3,1 2,3 3,1
Temporary employment 3,1 2,4 3,6 1,2
Overall EPL Version 2 2,8 2,2
Collective dismissals 2,1 2,8
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1999Employment Protection Reform 20
The ﬁrm must show that the layoﬀ (or layoﬀs) are the
result of a “real transformation or elimination of job(s)”.
What this exactly means is even more unclear. The ambi-
guity, and why this is an issue, is best shown in the recent
case of layoﬀs at Michelin–Wolber. In July 1999, Miche-
lin decided to lay 451 workers oﬀ at its Wolber plant,
at the same time as it was announcing large beneﬁts for
the group as a whole. In February 2002, the labor tri-
bunal concluded that the layoﬀs were not justiﬁed, and
asked Michelin to pay a total of 10 million Euros to the
162 laid oﬀ employees who had contested the decision,
or about 60,000 euros per employee. The tribunal argued
that “layoﬀs for economic reasons cannot be justiﬁed on
the basis of improving the competitiveness or the proﬁts
of the ﬁrm, but only on the basis of maintaining its com-
petitiveness. In the case of Michelin, the purpose was to
improve competitiveness, and thus the layoﬀs were not
justiﬁed”. (The First Court of Appeals conﬁrmed the de-
cision in october 2003).14 Lest one think that this is an
isolated case, very much the same thinking was embodied
in the December 2001 law, which stated that, only when
other avenues had been exhausted, were layoﬀs justiﬁed.
The legislation provided for only three possible grounds
for economic layoﬀs: major economic diﬃculties where
14. A charitable interpretation of the court’s opinion is that the ﬁrm should
exercise more restraint with regards to layoﬀs when it is not liquidity
constrained (such a conditioning would make economic sense). We doubt,
though, that the courts have the ability and the information to make such
business judgments.Employment Protection Reform 21
all possible solutions have been exhausted, technological
changes endangering the very survival of the company,
reorganization required to ensure the survival of the com-
pany. Two of the provisions of the law were subsequently
(January 2002) thrown out by the French Supreme Court
(the Conseil Constitutionel) on the grounds that the law
had moved from the principle that layoﬀs were justiﬁed
if they were required to maintain competitiveness to the
principle that layoﬀs were justiﬁed if they were required
to ensure the survival of the ﬁrm—a much more stringent
criterion.
In short, the principles that the courts must use in assessing
whether layoﬀs are justiﬁed are extremely unclear; and certainly
the fact that the ﬁrm decided that such layoﬀs were necessary
is clearly not by itself suﬃcient proof for the courts.
Netherlands: At a formal level, the Dutch situation does not
appear all that diﬀerent. The burden of proof in principle also
rests on the employer, who must bring hard evidence that the
employment relationship ought to be terminated. Courts require
a dossier before they are willing to treat cases. For a personal
layoﬀ, the employer must show malfunctioning, disability15 or
serious misbehavior. Economic layoﬀs are deemed to be jus-
tiﬁed if “adverse circumstances” call for a reorganization or
a bankruptcy. As in France, the absence of objective criteria
confers substantial discretion upon administrative bodies and
15. See section 1.3 for a description of the process for laying oﬀ sick or
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judges.
2.2 Limited direct ﬁnancial costs
Payroll and layoﬀ taxes
In both countries, payments by ﬁrms to cover unemployment
beneﬁts are collected through payroll taxes. In France, the pay-
ments come for half from the workers, for half from the ﬁrms.
In the Netherlands, there are two funds: One, the “Reduced
Pay Fund”, for short-term unemployed (less than 33 weeks) and
the other, the “General Unemployment Fund”, distributing the
remaining payments. The average payroll tax rates are quite
diﬀerent for those two funds: the employee plus employer con-
tribution rate is 7.35% for the latter and 1.30% for the former.
Unsurprisingly, in the current, low unemployment, context, the
General Unemployment Fund is running large surpluses. The
Reduced Pay Fund is running a deﬁcit. In both countries, the
rate is independent of the history of layoﬀs by the ﬁrm—in our
terminology, the contribution rate (recall: deﬁned as the ratio of
the layoﬀ tax to unemployment beneﬁts) is zero.
One exception in both countries, relates to the layoﬀs of older
workers. In France, the “contribution Delalande”, introduced
in 1987, mandates additional payments to the unemployment
agency in case of layoﬀs of older workers. For large ﬁrms (50
employees or more), the contribution is equal to two months for
a5 0y e a ro l d ,i n c r e a s i n gt o1 2m o n t h sf o ra5 6y e a ro l d ,a n dd e -
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of months being halved for ﬁrms with less than 50 employees).
In the Netherlands, workers over 57,5 years are protected di-
rectly by a higher severance pay, an exception to the otherwise
prevailing last in–ﬁrst out rule for selecting laid-oﬀ workers, and
protected indirectly by the requirement that the ﬁrm pay part
of the unemployment beneﬁt. The share of the unemployment
cost born by the ﬁrm remains small, though (from 10% for ﬁrms
with less than 6 workers to 30% for ﬁrms with over 50 workers).
Such measures go in the direction of discouraging layoﬀs that
are on average socially costly, but they also give rise to “thresh-
old eﬀects’ as they encourage ﬁrms to discharge workers before
they reach the age requirement.
Another exception to the absence of internalization is supplied
by the Dutch sickness and disability system, in which experience
rating was progressively introduced starting in the early 1990s,
following an obvious abuse of the system by employers and em-
ployees. Dutch employers now have to pay sick workers full pay
for a year (as opposed to 12 weeks in France). Experience rating
in disability insurance was introduced in 1998. Today, employers
have incentives not to have their employees disabled: They have
to pay a substantial part of the disability costs for 5 years. In
order to reduce the employers’ concomitant incentive to screen
out employees with high sickness or disability risk, employers
are exonerated from this penalty if they hire a person with a
registered work handicap, and they receive reductions in their
sickness and disability insurance premia when keeping or hiringEmployment Protection Reform 24
employees with work handicaps.16
Severance payments
Severance payments mandated by French law are relatively low,
and grow more than proportionally with seniority: 2/10 months
per year of seniority, plus, for workers with more than 10 years,
2/15 months per year above 10 years. This gives 2 months for a
worker with 10 years seniority, 8.3 months for a worker with 30
years seniority.
“Quasi-legal” levels of severance pay (meaning: according to the
formula agreed upon by sub-district courts. In 1997, 75% of the
sub-district judges reported to have used this formula) are more
generous in the Netherlands. The number of months received
depends on the number of years in service and the age of the
worker. For example, a 50-year old with 10 years of service re-
ceives 15 months of severance payments. A correction factor can
also be applied (for example a layoﬀ motivated by poor employee
behavior cuts the severance pay by anything from 0 to 100%.
Conversely, the correction factor may exceed 1 in case the em-
ployer is to blame).17 Administrative bodies do not determine
16. For more on incentives in this system, see van der Ploeg (2003).
17. The courts’ formula goes as follows: The level of severance payment is
given by the product A × B × C where
– A is a weighted average of number of years of service. Years of
service receive weight 1 before age 40, 1.5 between age 40 and age
50, and 2 after age 50;
– B is the last earned monthly wage of the employee;
– C is the correction factor.Employment Protection Reform 25
severance payments, but they deﬁne a “noticing period”, over
which the worker still receives pay.
2.3 Procedure
France: Firms that decide to lay workers oﬀ for personal or
economic reasons must follow an often long series of administra-
tive steps. These steps have two separate purposes. The ﬁrst is
to give time to the workers to prepare themselves for the lay-
oﬀ and to facilitate their reemployment. Depending on seniority,
workers get an advance notice of up to three months. Workers in
large ﬁrms (1000 employees or more) are entitled to a retraining
period (“cong´ e reclassement”) of 4 to 9 months. For the part of
the period that coincides with the advance notice period, work-
ers get 100% of their salary; for the rest of the period, they get
65% of their salary, paid by the ﬁrm. Under the new unemploy-
ment insurance system, workers in smaller ﬁrms are eligible for
training and help in ﬁnding jobs from the start of their advance
notice (the “PARE anticip´ e”), not the moment they become
unemployed. The other purpose is, oﬃcially, to make sure that
alternatives to the layoﬀs have been fully explored.
The steps (which must take place before workers are notiﬁed of
the layoﬀ) grow more numerous with the size of the ﬁrm, and the
size of the layoﬀs. For layoﬀs for personal reasons, the steps are
typically minimal—an interview and the sending of an oﬃcial
letter. For layoﬀs for economic reasons, and for ﬁrms with more
than 100 workers, the process can take up to half a year. The
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the workers, the presentation by the ﬁrm of a detailed “plan to
save jobs” (“Plan de sauvegarde de l’emploi”), the approval of
the labor inspection oﬃce; they may also involve the nomination
of an auditor if requested by worker representatives, and the
recourse to an arbitrator if the workers’ representatives disagree
with the ﬁrm’s plan.
At the end of this process, the ﬁrm can start the advance notice
period, and then proceed with the layoﬀs. But the workers, if
they disagree, can go to court. Diﬀerent courts have diﬀerent
jurisdictions. In case of collective layoﬀs, workers or ﬁrms go
to regular tribunals (“Tribunaux d’instance” or “Tribunaux de
grande instance”.) For individual layoﬀs, as for most labor con-
tract disputes, the standard court is the a labor tribunal known
as the “Prud’hommes”, an institution created in 1806. Each such
tribunal has two elected union representatives and two elected
representatives from employers’ organizations. In case of a tie,
the decisive vote is cast by a professional judge. When a case is
taken to the Prud’hommes, the ﬁrst step is an attempt at arbi-
tration (“audience de conciliation”). The second is a judgment
(“audience de jugement”), which can decide that layoﬀs were
not justiﬁed, and impose ﬁnes and payments to the ﬁrm. (98%
of the cases are brought by workers, only 2% by ﬁrms; 80% of the
cases are decided in favor of workers). The judgment can then
be appealed, going ﬁrst to the appeals court (“Cour d’appel”),
then possibly to the highest court (“Cour de cassation”); 50%
of the cases are appealed, 70% are decided in favor of workers.
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rapidly in the recent past, reaching close to 200,000 new cases
(half of those related to layoﬀs) per year at the end of the 1990s.
Both at regular tribunals, and at the Prud’hommes, the delays in
reaching a decision can be substantial (the mean time to the ﬁrst
judgment at Prud’hommes is now around 10 months). If layoﬀs
are found not to be justiﬁed, the ﬁrm has to pay additional
severance payments. These payments can be substantial. If for
example the ﬁrm has more than 11 employees, and the worker
has more than two years seniority, severance payments must be
at least equal to six months.
Netherlands: The Dutch process is quite similar in spirit, with a
prior-check institution in place for nearly 60 years, but it is much
more expedient.18 Dutch ﬁrms are oﬀered a menu of options:
The ﬁrst option is the administrative process. After an advance
notice period (which in the case of individual layoﬀs increases
with the worker’s seniority and goes from 1 to 4 months), the
ﬁrm can attempt to obtain authorization from a public adminis-
trative body, currently the Center for Work and Income (CWI).
The procedure is rather lengthy, but cheap.
Alternatively the ﬁrm can make its case to the sub-district court
(without advance notice period). The procedure is then more ex-
pensive, but involves smaller delays. In principle, the procedure
is completed within a month. The costs of the administrative and
court procedures are estimated at about 5,000 and 27,225 euros,
18. In 1975, France introduced the need for prior administrative authoriza-
tion. This requirement was eliminated in 1986.Employment Protection Reform 28
respectively (van Zevenbergen-Oelen 2000). Despite the cost, the
swift procedure appeals to many ﬁrms, especially large ones. For
the ﬁrst time, in 1998, the number of requests for dissolution ﬁled
at sub-district courts exceeded the number of requests ﬁled with
the administrative bodies. In either case decisions are seldom in
favor of workers. For example, for individual dismissals and the
administrative procedure, only 6% of the ﬁrms’ requests are re-
jected (CPB1997). According to van Zevenbergen-Oelen (2000),
the courts and administrative bodies allowed the layoﬀs in 96.5%
of cases. Of course, such statistics must be taken with caution;
after all 20% of the layoﬀ demands are withdrawn and employers
do not seem to be willing to engage in a procedure unless they
have a particularly strong case.
2.4 Instruments of ﬂexibility: ﬁxed duration
contracts and outsourcing
a) Fixed-duration contracts
France: Since the late 1970s, successive governments have in-
troduced ﬁxed–term contracts, called “contrats ` a dur´ ee deter-
min´ ee”, or CDDs. These contracts still require a severance pay-
ment, but eliminate the recourse to courts when termination
takes place at the end of the contract.19
A brief history of CDDs goes as follows: CDDs were introduced
in 1979. With the election of a socialist government in 1981 and
the passage of another law in 1982, their scope was reduced: A
list of 12 conditions was drawn, and only under those conditions
19. Poulain (1994) gives a detailed description of the rules governing CDDs.Employment Protection Reform 29
could ﬁrms use ﬁxed-term contracts. In 1986, the 12 conditions
were replaced by a general rule: CDDs should not be used to ﬁll
a permanent position in the ﬁrm. The current architecture dates
for the most part to an agreement signed in March 1990. Under
this agreement, CDDs can be oﬀered by ﬁrms for only one of four
reasons: (1) The replacement of an employee on leave (2) Tem-
porary increases in activity (3) Seasonal activities (4) Special
contracts, aimed at facilitating employment for targeted groups,
from the young to the long term unemployed. The list of special
contracts has grown in the 1990s, as each government has tried
to improve labor market outcomes for one group or another;
some of these contracts require the ﬁrm to provide training, and
many come with subsidies to ﬁrms.
Fixed duration contracts are subject to a very short trial pe-
riod, typically one month. Their duration goes from 6 to 18
months, depending on the speciﬁc contract type. Mean duration
is roughly one year. They typically cannot be renewed, and, in
any case, cannot be renewed beyond 24 months. If the worker is
kept, he or she must then be hired on a regular open-ended con-
tract, called a Contrat ` a dur´ ee ind´ etermin´ ee (CDI). If the worker
is not kept, he or she receives a severance payment equal to 10%
of the total salary received during the life of the contract.20 Note
that this is a much higher percentage of salary than is the case
for severance on regular contracts. But, as emphasized earlier,
workers on CDDs cannot go to the Prud’hommes to contest the
end of employment on the CDD.
20. As of January 2003. A collective agreement can bring this “prime de
pr´ ecarit´ e” down to 6% in exchange for additional training.Employment Protection Reform 30
Fixed duration contracts have been very popular with ﬁrms, and
represent now 70% of the ﬂow of hires, and a bit above 10% of
total employment.
Netherlands: By contrast, Dutch workers on ﬁxed duration con-
tracts receive no severance pay. However, the divide between
ﬁxed duration and open-ended contracts does not seem as sharp
as in France. Two recent reforms, the Flexibility and Security
Act (that originated in a 1996 Labour Foundation agreement
between the social partners and came into force on January 1,
1999), and a new law in 2001, grant new rights to ﬁxed-duration
contracts: transformation, under certain conditions, of consec-
utive temporary employment contracts into a permanent one,
requirement for ﬁrms to oﬀer vacancies for open-ended contracts
to employees on ﬁxed-duration contracts, treatment of contracts
with temporary employment agencies as permanent contracts.
As Table 2 on new work relationships demonstrates, the share of
temporary workers in the ﬂow of new hires is much smaller than
in France (while the 2000 percentage of workers on a temporary
contract, 12%, is comparable with the French level):Employment Protection Reform 31
Terms of employment 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Stable 313 50% 375 50% 570 56% 661 58% 733 62% 723 65%
Temporary work 76 12% 105 14% 139 14% 154 14% 125 11% 99 9%
Remaining temporary 177 28% 199 27% 193 19% 226 20% 245 21% 200 18%
Freelance 40 6% 46 6% 58 6% 64 6% 42 4% 39 4%
Remaining 26 4% 20 3% 58 6% 25 2% 32 3% 38 3%
Total 632 745 1.018 1.130 1.177 1.108
Table 2
Source: Research voor Beleid/Arbeidsvoorziening (HZW2000)
The Dutch unions’ willingness to improve the rights of tempo-
rary workers in exchange of a relaxation of statutory dismissal
protection is as remarkable as their actions in favor of part-time
work and integration of women in the work force. By contrast,
French unions traditionally focus (except rhetorically) on the
interests of workers with open-ended contracts.
b) Outsourcing
In the Netherlands, the Flexibility and Security Act made it
more attractive for traditional employers to outsource, as they
can call the same workers as many times as they want (there is no
limitation to the number of contracts an employer can sign with
an employee of a temporary work agency-TWA). The employee
has a regular contract with the temporary work agency. The new
regulation improved the rights of the employees of TWAs but
do not require more from employers employing workers throughEmployment Protection Reform 32
these TWA. In that sense, it provides ﬂexibility to traditional
employers and reduces their labor costs (for example, they do
not have to pay ﬁring costs; they can simply not re-employ the
worker at the end of the temporary contract).
3 Contours of employment protection
reform in France and in the Netherlands
In our report on employment protection reform in France, we
concluded that there was a strong case for reform along three
major dimensions: An increase in the marginal ﬁnancial cost of
layoﬀs for ﬁrms, a decrease in the role of courts, and a reduc-
tion of the sharp contrast between permanent and temporary
contracts. It would be presomptuous for us to make speciﬁc rec-
ommendations for the Netherlands. But our assessment is that
the ﬁrst dimension is equally important for the Netherlands,
while the other two are probably less important: In those two
dimensions, Netherlands has largely avoided some of the prob-
lems France is now facing.
L e tu sr e v i e wt h et h r e ed i m e n s i o n si nt u r n :
1: An increase in the marginal ﬁnancial cost of layoﬀs for
ﬁrms.
We saw that the contribution rate of ﬁrms should be positive,
although probably less than one.
Starting either from the French or the Dutch current legislation,
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of unemployment contributions by ﬁrms related to their layoﬀ
behavior. While shifting to a positive contribution rate will in-
duce ﬁrms to reduce layoﬀs, this increase in employment protec-
tion (with payments from ﬁrms to the unemployment insurance
agency, rather than directly to workers) will be less visible to
workers than some of the other forms of employment protection.
But it is nevertheless an increase in employment protection: It
leads ﬁrms to take into account the social costs of unemploy-
ment, and decrease their layoﬀ rate.
If and when such a payroll tax is introduced, is there a role
left for severance payments, direct payments to workers? We
think so, but their role should be only to oﬀset the costs of job
loss (as separate from unemployment). This should be their only
and limited purpose; unemployment insurance is better provided
through unemployment beneﬁts. Given that the costs of job loss
appear to be increasing and convex in seniority, this suggests
the use of a schedule which is increasing and convex in seniority,
with low payments until high seniority is achieved.
Here, there may be a relevant diﬀerence between France and the
Netherlands. Legally mandated severance payments in France
are, as we saw, relatively low. Quasi-legal severance payments
in the Netherlands are signiﬁcantly higher. Adding a layoﬀ tax
to these severance payments may lead to excessive payments
by ﬁrms in case of layoﬀ. In this case, it may make sense to
decrease severance payments paid by ﬁrms as the layoﬀ tax is
introduced. This however will have distributional implications:
If unemployment insurance payments are not increased, workersEmployment Protection Reform 34
will receive smaller overall payments in case of unemployment
(smaller severance payments, same unemployment beneﬁts).
In any case, if severance payments are convex in seniority, there
are constraints, as we saw in our discussion of the Delalande
contribution in France, on how steep the schedule can be at
high seniority. If it is too steep, it runs the risk of generating
discrimination against middle–age workers.
In case of bankruptcy, ﬁrms should be liable for layoﬀ taxes and
severance payments, and the state should be a senior creditor.
As we know however from recent cases, ﬁrms have an incen-
tive to escape those liabilities by designing complex structures
of ownership so as to beneﬁt from limited liability. The prob-
lem will only grow more serious, if, as we argue should happen,
contribution rates are increased.
2: A decrease in the role of courts in case of layoﬀs, leading
to a less costly and less uncertain process for ﬁrms.
In light of our discussion, the heavy hand of the judicial process,
as it now exists in France, seems largely unjustiﬁed. We do not
see why the Prud’hommes or tribunals should be asked to second
guess the decision of the ﬁrm, if the ﬁrm goes through the proper
administrative steps and is willing to pay both contributions to
the UI fund and severance payments to its workers.
The role of the tribunals in France should therefore be much
more limited than it is today. Courts should, if requested by the
dismissed workers or the fund, check that proper administrative
steps have been taken, and that contributions and severance areEmployment Protection Reform 35
being paid, and, in the case of an individual layoﬀ, that the ﬁrm
did not discriminate (e.g., against a union representative or a
pregnant woman) and did not harass the worker to masquarade
a layoﬀ as a quit.
In this respect, the Netherlands appears in much better shape
than France. In practice, courts are much more expeditious.
While one might worry that the need for administrative au-
thorization led to a heavy burden on ﬁrms (this was the case
in France when such an authorization was in place), this does
not appear to be the case. Thus, it does not appear essential to
modify that aspect of the employment protection system in the
Netherlands.
3: The sharp contrast between ﬁxed-duration and open-ended
contracts should be eliminated.
The elimination of the two-contract regime in place in France
should reduce the dual nature of the labor market, which we see
as a major and perverse eﬀect of recent reforms. The increase
in the ﬁnancial marginal cost of laying oﬀ a worker, compen-
sated by a decrease in the complexity and the uncertainty of the
layoﬀ process, might well be more attractive both to ﬁrms and
to workers. The appeal for French ﬁrms of ﬁxed-duration con-
tracts, which combine a higher severance pay than open-ended
contracts, with a much simpler process of termination, suggests
that ﬁrms would be eager to accept such a trade oﬀ. But we
believe that this need not come with a decrease in the welfare
of workers, both those on ﬁxed-duration contracts, and those
on open-ended contracts. Given its goals, the current system isEmployment Protection Reform 36
ineﬃcient. Eﬃciency gains can make both sides better oﬀ.
Here, again, the Netherlands appears to have less of a problem,
and indeed, may oﬀer some directions of reform for France. Even
if political considerations make it diﬃcult for France to shift
from a two-contract regime to a common regime, the purpose
should be to reduce the diﬀerences between the two regimes over
time, so as to avoid the sharp threshold eﬀects that characterize
the current system.Employment Protection Reform 37
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